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Abstract
In this article I conduct an examination of discursive identity of a legal
‘object’ in the course of its treatment by various ﬁgures in the legal process.
The need for this examination arises from a widespread concern about the
e¤ects of creating ‘records’, i.e., transforming spoken discourse by way of
documentation into ‘evidence’. After a brief review of the current discussion
about this phenomenon, I argue that the identity of textualized evidence is
upheld by way of references to other texts, all of which create a ﬁeld of
signiﬁcation within which an object under discussion (evidence) shows dif-
ferent facets without however losing its identity. In order to support my ar-
gument, I o¤er an analysis of ethnographic data pertaining to a speciﬁc
criminal case. My objective for the analysis is to trace the status of a spe-
ciﬁc discursive identity after its enunciation during an attorney–client con-
ference. My ﬁndings indicate that textualization should be understood not
as a form of ﬁxity for discourse, but rather as semantic pivot that provides
for di¤erent ‘argumentation ﬁgures’ within the referential grid of the legal
case.
Keywords: discursive identity; legal discourse; textualization; transforma-
tion; ﬁgure; arguable.
1. Introduction
This article concerns itself with the question of textualization in legal dis-
course. More speciﬁcally, it examines the ongoing treatment of some pre-
viously textualized evidentiary discourse by various legal ﬁgures. There
has been a widespread and ongoing concern among many scholars who
suggest that legal professionals intrinsically possess and regularly exercise
interactional control over their clients, sometimes to the detriment of
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adequate and e¤ective service (Hosticka 1979; Cain 1983; Bogoch 1994).
Control in interaction can manifest itself in a variety of ways, one of them
being the activity of creating ‘records’, i.e., transforming spoken discourse
that belongs to a nonprofessional, i.e., the client, and, by default, the
realm of the ordinary and mundane, in accordance with the institutional
rules of documentation (Garﬁnkel 1967; Benson and Drew 1978; Atkin-
son and Drew 1979; Travers 1997; Lynch 1999, 2002). For legal
research, the common problem with textualized appearances lies in ‘the
reduction of facts to law’ (Stygall 1994: 88).
It has been further argued that in the course of the talk-to-text transfor-
mation legal documents would acquire the character of evidence by virtue
of the transformation itself. Empirical studies that focus on the activities
of documentation show the capacity of record making to shape, reshape,
and thus alter oral discourse by way of literalizing its ‘core’ for speciﬁc
purposes of the legal establishment (Lemert 1969; Ra¤el 1979; Goodrich
1984; Jo¨nsson and Linell 1991; Linell 1998). Upon closer scrutiny of these
and other sources, it becomes clear that the apparent problem with docu-
menting activity of law is informed by two co-dependent assumptions: (i)
transfer from one communication medium to another, from one speaker
to another, from one discourse to another, and from one situational task
to another, implying (ii) the ﬁnite separation of the original discourse
from its ‘record’. In other words, it is assumed that, in its documented
form, i.e., a written statement or a deposition, the defendant’s narrative
is going to di¤er radically from its point of origin, an oral recital of facts.
Moreover, in order for a fact of life to become a ‘legal fact’, it must be
pre-separated from the point of its origin. Secondly and co-extensively,
for the ‘record’ to count as a fact, it must be ﬁxed in the legal discourse
as if it were the original.
I focus the present study on the aforementioned second assumption. At
issue is the proposition that once in-text, discourse creates a singularity of
meaning, which, from that moment on, allows legal professionals to refer
to it as ‘the same matter’. Since the process of documenting not only
makes discourse appear factual, but also objectiﬁes it, I would like to
approach documented facts, commonly known as evidence, as ‘objects of
discourse’ or ‘discursive objects’. Short of challenging the idea of ﬁxity per
se, I would like to question the association between the documented state-
ment and its identity. Once disclosed, this association would become indic-
ative of the structure of a particular legal fact, or evidence; hence the ques-
tion for this examination becomes: How is factual identity constituted in
legal records?
The question receives diverse elaborations in recent critical examina-
tions of discourse formation. For example, Gilles Deleuze proposes that,
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in discourse, an object functions as a virtual object and, as such, it is
always necessarily partial (1968). One part remains ﬁxed in a particular
discourse while the other is open to further signiﬁcation. This structure is
unsettled as it creates a conﬂict between the place of ﬁxation and the
space of signiﬁcation. The conﬂict brings about ‘an impression of reality’
(Deleuze 1968: 101; italics in original). In legal discourse, documented
texts tend to promote this very impression. Not only do they archive
‘facts’ following prescribed legal formats, their key purpose is to make
these facts ‘come alive’, i.e., perform themselves whether in front of the
jury or the judge (Matoesian 2001: 105). Thus, a second question follows:
How can we understand archived facts from the perspective of the above
theoretical standpoint?
2. Evidence as an object of discourse
Following the theoretical discussion from the previous section, an object
of discourse should be understood not as the same matter, but as a
matter-in-becoming, which continues its dynamism from within the place
of ﬁxation. In turn, on the basis of this conceptualization, we can con-
ceive of the matter-in-becoming as an object of discourse that is capable
of transcending its original form and thereby ‘appearing’ in talk or in
text, respectively. Matoesian (2000: 88) calls this capacity for the eviden-
tial source to enter and leave di¤erent media through the intertextual con-
nection ‘production media’. Although helpful in showing how intertex-
tuality generates competing versions of the apparently same event, the
notion of ‘production media’ seems to concern itself with the ambiguous
side of the ﬁxed object only. With this concern it complements the re-
search on the ‘career’ of a legal statement, which is primarily focused on
the deﬁnitive side of the transformational process. By focusing on either
polarity—ambiguity and deﬁniteness—in a manner of separation, neither
approach is capable of clarifying the possibility that both outcomes can
be a¤ected simultaneously. Adopting the latter perspective I propose to
investigate interactional processes and communicative conditions that al-
low for an object to appear as both ‘ﬁxed’, i.e., count as an established
fact, and at the same time retain its dynamism. With this dual focus, we
should reformulate the previously posed question in the following man-
ner: How can a documented fact both be and become, at the same time?
In order to conceive of identity in di¤erence, I would like to focus on
the concept of cohesion. Cohesion can be deﬁned as a set of resources
that allows discourse to ‘transcend grammatical structure’ (Halliday
1994: 309). Thus deﬁned, cohesion helps trace the identity of an object in
the process of its becoming, i.e., as it takes place in a speciﬁc space of
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signiﬁcation. Importantly, the space of signiﬁcation is not a context, nor
is it a sum of manifest entities. Rather, it is a set of conditions that allow
for carrying out meaningful attributions. Those are always discourse and
task speciﬁc. Their speciﬁcity is inﬂuenced by a particular setting; in turn,
the setting shows itself in the means of its unfolding. For an object-in-
becoming to continue, it must invariably engage three co-extensive levels:
grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic. The relationship between the
three levels should not be presumed; rather, it manifests itself in certain
discourse markers, such as the article, conjunction, pronouns, syntactic
position, and synonymy, among others (Schi¤rin 1987). Those and other
means ‘signal’ the degree of sameness and di¤erence, which is su‰ciently
subtle to create ambiguity and, at the same time, su‰ciently deﬁnite to
allow an interlocutor to understand the sameness of the object under dis-
cussion (Kartunnen 1968; Chafe 1976; Hawkins 1978; Du Bois 1980). The
constitutive features of cohesion point to the bipolar structure of the dis-
cursive object: for an object of discourse, ambiguity resides on the other
side of deﬁniteness (He 2001; Gotti 2005). This is to say that ambiguity
di¤ers from nondeﬁniteness not as its opposite, the lack of deﬁnitiveness,
but because it performs a di¤erent communicative function (Scheglo¤
1984). More speciﬁcally, while deﬁniteness comes about as a result of uti-
lizing certain means of explication, ambiguity provides the space for fur-
ther explication. Therefore, the relationship between deﬁniteness and am-
biguity is not that of subordination but that of co-determination.1 On the
level of interaction, cohesion must be performed by way of topical align-
ment (Clayman 1992; Pomerantz 1984). The key resource of alignment is
formulation (Drew and Holt 1998; Pomerantz 1986). It is this resource
that forms the focal point of my attention in the subsequent analysis. I
preview the analysis with a brief description of the ethnographic site. I
also elaborate on the issues of data collection and presentation.
3. ‘A bunch of good for nothing riﬂes’
The present investigation is limited to one oral excerpt and several written
excerpts from a speciﬁc case, the data for which was collected during ex-
tensive ethnographic ﬁeldwork in a private law ﬁrm, ‘Dorman, Tucker
and Tucker’, located in a small town in one of the Great Plains states dur-
ing two consecutive summers, in 2003 and 2004.2 At the time, the ﬁrm
consisted of three partners: Jack Dorman, my principal informant, and
Tom and Frank Tucker, the ﬁrm’s original founders.3 Jack was the attor-
ney whom I shadowed for the duration of my ﬁeldwork. The ﬁrm’s em-
phasis was family law: divorce and child custody cases comprised over
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70% of the practice’s earnings. Insurance and worker’s compensation pre-
sented another lucrative category. In contrast to the civil caseload, crimi-
nal cases in the ﬁrm appeared on occasion and, in Jack’s own words, were
there ‘to ﬁll the gap’. Among those ﬁllers, there were many misdemeanor
cases, such as DUI (driving under the inﬂuence), simple assault, and
small theft, with an occasional felony, such as grand theft, aggravated as-
sault, rape, and manslaughter. The original focus of my research was
criminal casework; more speciﬁcally, I was interested in the relationship
between the pre-trial practices and activities that counted as preparatory
for the criminal case and the ways they helped present the case at the trial
stage. It was this interest that prompted Jack to invite me to the local jail
for ‘a talk with the biggest criminal on the Federal plate’.
The case in question had been under investigation for two years. Jack’s
client was charged with ‘conspiracy, use of a communication facility in
causing or facilitating the commission of a felony under the controlled
substance act’, and a number of minor violations. This is to say that he
ran a small drug gang of low paid ‘mules’ and distributors. Incarcerated
at the time of my visit, Dane, the defendant, was facing the sentencing.
About a month before the visit, in the face of the overwhelming evidence
from the US Attorney, Dane agreed to a plea bargain. The terms and the
conditions of the plea bargain agreement required that he disclose the
names and criminal actions of his accomplices, i.e., that he become a wit-
ness for the prosecution. In exchange for his cooperation, the federal gov-
ernment promised that his sentencing would be cut in half. The number
of years to be reduced depended on the calculations made by the proba-
tion o‰cer for the federal judge in accordance with the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines in the Presentence Report. The purpose of the meeting with
Dane in jail was to discuss the report. The report had been sent to Dane
in advance, together with Jack’s letter, which explained some of the tech-
nicalities, including those concerning the upcoming sentencing. On the
designated day, Jack and I walked over to the county jail. The meeting
took place in the jail’s ‘library’. The discussion lasted approximately forty
minutes. I recorded parts of the interaction. In addition, I took extensive
notes. The excerpt below is a transcript based on both sources of data. It
begins several minutes into the conversation. The ethnographic bias for
this examination prompts me to use the conference as an entry point
into the discussion. Documented excerpts from the case ﬁle constitute ad-
ditional sources of data for the subsequent analysis. The use of a single
case points to the indicative rather than deﬁnitive spirit of this study. The
transcription below is designed in the manner of the theatrical script, as a
dialogue, where the speakers’ names precede the utterances (Jack is desig-
nated as ‘J’ and Dane as ‘D’).
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(1)
1 J: So, as you can see, rule 35 will put you in the 27–32
2 month bracket. I know. I know, but that was
3 the plea-bargain agreement
[a few minutes later].
4 So, you are getting 27 to 32 years.
5 D: What was did you just say? 27 to 32 years. You must
6 be joking. Is it a joke? I hope not. Do you even know
7 who I am? I am a nark.4 Do you even understand what it
8 means for a fucking nark to be in a maximum-security
9 prison for 20 years. I will croak in the fucking prison.
10 I will be in the same outﬁt as murderers and rapists and
11 sadists. I will have to ﬁght for my life every single day.
12 My ass is grass, pal!
13 J: I understand that it is a disability; it will put you
14 in a situation. But you will be able to deal with it.
15 Besides, as I told you, you will not get that sentence.
16 You cooperated, so they will cut it in half. You will
17 be out sooner than you think.’
[ten minutes later]
18 D: But you told me that I would get ﬁve to seven years.
19 J: It appeared that way ﬁrst but that’s what happened.
20 Look. They added a couple of levels: you were
21 on an unsupervised probation for some DUI misdemeanor
22 and that upped your sentence by two levels.
23 D: So, I am getting four years of hard labor for
24 a fucking misdemeanor!
25 J: Then. Here. See? You had possession of
26! illegal weapons.
27! D: But they were fucking BB guns. A .22 and a .35!
28 I took them with me to shoot some damn prairie dogs.
29 They were there in the trunk, and I told the cops
30 when they pulled me over in Leams that they were
31 right there in the fucking trunk. I didn’t hide nothing.
[ﬁve minute pause, attorney looking through the ﬁle]
32 J: Okay, that’s good, and that’s what we need to
33 talk about today. I will ﬁle an objection,
34 and we are going to say that you had them riﬂes
35 to shoot prairie dogs, right? And that it wasn’t like
36! a GUN gun but a bunch of good for nothing riﬂes.
37! D: And they never found a handgun on me.
38 They pulled me over, and they searched the car,
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39 and they found nothing. They took me to the station
40 and they found zippo in my house later.
41 J: Okay. Then, we are going to say that you showed
42 good on these accusations and they need
43 to ease o¤ your back a little.
44 D: Fifteen years. I will croak in prison then, should
45 have told the Feds nothing. I should have kept quiet
46 and stay out of this plea-bargaining shit! I should have
47 taken it to the fucking trial.
There are several discursive objects generated by this account. Due to
space constraints, I would like to focus on only one of them, which was
introduced by the attorney as ‘illegal weapons’ (line 26). The item ‘weap-
ons’ entered the interaction in the oral mode as it was enunciated by the
attorney. Grammatically, it was given in the nominal form, as a substan-
tive. This way of appearance is not accidental: according to Komter
(2006), the nominal form is common if not preferential for the legal dis-
course because it reﬂects the nominalization of criminal charges in crimi-
nal codes and statutes. Coinciding with the act of enunciation is the act of
pointing to the legal document that ‘housed’ the object. The referenced
text was a copy of the Presentence Report compiled by the probation of-
ﬁcer for all the parties ( judge, prosecutor, and defense ensemble). The
purpose of the document is to prepare the federal defendant, who chose
to plead guilty to the precalculated sentence. In addition to other func-
tions (proﬁling the defendant), the document is designed to present the
charges as well as various circumstances that aggravate or mitigate these
charges. A formula from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is applied to
the calculations to designate a certain level that would give the judge a
range of sentencing options. The place in the report that references the
item ‘illegal weapons’ dealt with the aggravating circumstance which, as
the attorney explained earlier, increased the sentencing brackets by two
levels. We might say then that the object came into the Presentence Re-
port and then into the attorney’s discourse linked to the legal rule. In
turn, the use of a rule has to satisfy a particular pragmatic force (Conley
and O’Barr 1990).
In the legal context this force is stated explicitly; it is inscribed in the
very word that designates the initiative by the court against the citizen:
‘a public complaint’ (Drew and Holt 1988). The complaint against Dane
Savery in regard to his illegal activities was stipulated by the following
rule: ‘Pursuant to USSG §2D1.1(b)(1), if a dangerous weapon (including
a ﬁrearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels. The defendant possessed
and transported ﬁrearms during drug transactions.’ In this statement we
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ﬁnd a split identity that precedes the attorney’s ‘illegal weapons’—‘a dan-
gerous weapon’ and a ‘ﬁrearm’. We might say then that it was the latter
identity that was ‘ﬁxed’ as a result of the talk-to-talk transformation. It
was ‘ﬁxed’ in text grammatically as an object, syntactically as a subject-
object, semantically as a ‘projectile weapon’, and pragmatically as an ac-
count in support of the legal rule (i.e., ‘The defendant possessed . . .’). The
textualization of this identity engages the operation of connecting the or-
dinary (a person in possession of a weapon) to the legal (possession of a
ﬁrearm during drug transaction, an illegal activity) realms. With this
transformation, the gun indeed becomes ‘an illegal weapon’. Let us look
at the original transformative path as it took place in the police report:
(2)
1 [ . . . ] after the truck pulled over, a man jumped out and
2 started running . . . I called for a back-up and pursued the
3 person on feet. When I caught up with him, I commanded
4 him to drop on the ground and show me his hands.
5 The person on the ground identiﬁed himself as Dane Savery
6 [ . . . ] When we searched the truck, we found small amounts of
7 Cannabis and methamphetamine. In the trunk, I discovered
8! two riﬂes, 22. Winchester and 35. Browning.
9! The chambers of both weapons were empty.
10 Also, in the trunk I found two unopened boxes
11! with cartridges, one for each ﬁrearm [ . . . ]
12 As a result of my ﬁeld investigation, I charged Savery
13 with possession of illegal substance, read him his rights
14 and arrested him [ . . . ]
This report does not only constitute the original document that captured
the item ‘weapons’ and ‘ﬁrearms’ for the ﬁrst time, it also establishes
the pattern of transformation of the ordinary term ‘riﬂe’ through a con-
cretization (minimization) of the kind of riﬂes into technical terms (line
8), ‘weapons’ and ‘ﬁrearm’ (line 9 and line 11, respectively). In their
actions—searching the vehicle and conﬁscating the weapons—the police
were mindful of Rule 104, Article 1 of the US Criminal Code ‘Rules of
Evidence’. Importantly and in accordance with the rule, the mentions of
the weapons at this point are not thematized in terms of their legality (as
they were not used by the defendant and were legal to possess due to their
small caliber, which excluded them from the list of licensed weapons), but
are noted in the prospective sense, as a possibly illegal item. The arrest
was committed on the basis of ‘possession of illegal substance’, not ‘illegal
weapons’. In this regard, Martinez (2006) is helpful in showing how
the interrelationship between the rules, the texts, and the activities of
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collecting evidence creates a complicated environment that allows some
oral discourse (e.g., witness testimony) to become a case-relevant object
of law by way of ﬁxing it in a speciﬁc documented form.
By returning to the replica of this form, the attorney ‘unﬁxes’ it, with-
out removing it from the legal discourse altogether (which he could have
done by starting a general discussion of di¤erent types of weapons and
their usefulness in hunting di¤erent kinds of game; instead, he ‘sets the
ﬁxed identity in motion’). Let us examine now how ‘the unﬁxing’ is made
possible. First, the attorney reformulates the textualized object by giving
it a somewhat altered form; he substitutes the ‘dangerous’ for ‘illegal’.
The point of institutional reformulation is to create a device ‘through
which a practice is mobilized by participants in a given interaction’
(Drew 2003: 296). In other words, the reformulation provides a summary
of the previous discourse in terms of another discourse that pursues a spe-
ciﬁc purpose. In this case, the purpose of the summarized term ‘illegal
weapons’ is to provide an account for the defendant’s accusation. The lex-
ical choice of the modiﬁer ‘illegal’ connotes a degree of ambiguity: to sim-
ply claim that something is illegal is only to claim that something could
be subjected to law. The pluralization of ‘weapons’ reinforces ambiguity
by endowing the object with volume and consistency of a generic item.
It is to that identity that Dane responds with his own formulation:
‘fucking BB Guns. A .22 and a .35’ (Example [1], line 27). With his re-
sponse, he turns down the attorney’s use of the legal term for a much
more potent colloquial expression. On a formal level, he also rejects both
the identity o¤ered by the attorney and the ﬁxed textual identity. How-
ever, we cannot say that Dane’s act of reformulation managed to remove
the object under discussion from the legal space of signiﬁcation. By his
own admission, Dane had indeed read Jack’s letter of 19 June 2003. The
letter contained the following formulation: ‘We have only 10 days from
the date we received the Report (June 18), to ﬁle objections to this. Call
me as soon as you can.’ In addition, the letter included a detailed expla-
nation of the reasons given by the probation o‰cer for several increases
up to Sentencing Level 35. The one concerning the illegal weapons was
described by the attorney as follows: ‘You also received a level 2 for the
use of a gun in the matter.’ Thus, the documents received by Dane prior
to the conference and apparently examined by him o¤ered him a choice
of the three co-determining terms: ‘dangerous weapons’ and ‘ﬁrearms’,
as stated in the Presentence Report, and ‘gun’, as stated in the attorney’s
letter. However, in his response, Dane deployed ‘fucking BB guns. A .22
and a .35’. By not repeating the term-in-text, but pro¤ering his own term,
unsurprisingly, Dane disa‰liates from the probation o‰cer and some-
what a‰liates with Jack, whose semi-formal formulation of ‘guns’ gives
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Dane a ‘lead’ to his own expression. In it, Dane manages to downgrade
the legal term ‘weapons’ to the mundane ‘guns’, thus challenging the rel-
evance of the term ‘weapons’ as a term contextualized in law. His further
description of the guns in the context of their caliber and intended use
(‘shooting prairie dogs’) formulates the challenge in positive terms as an
intention to ‘legitimize’ the identity of ‘guns’ on the grounds of ‘common
sense’. Collaborating in ‘close proximity’ helps Dane and his attorney
make a selection of the ‘right’ kind of information for its subsequent re-
formulation in what appears to be ‘direct evidence’ (Sarangi 1998: 263).
The next reformulation comes immediately after and belongs to the
attorney: ‘them riﬂes . . . not like a GUN gun . . . a bunch of good for
nothing riﬂes’ (Example [1], lines 34–36). The reformulation is given as a
lateral repeat of the defendant’s downgrade; however, its form exhibits
some di¤erence. The phrasing of ‘good for nothing riﬂes’ presents speciﬁc
guns as a general category of ‘riﬂes’. Although ostensibly a ‘weapon’,
‘riﬂe’ is a category that does not usually include handguns, or automatic
weapons. Riﬂes are used for hunting; so, they can be just riﬂes. Therefore,
following the trajectory of the client’s reformulation, in his own reformula-
tion, the attorney signals his acceptance of the defendant’s downgrade as
the primary reason for the subsequent legal action: ‘I will ﬁle an objection’.
With this act, the item ‘riﬂes’ is set to be transposed back into the properly
legal realm as a legal arguable. Dane’s clarifying interjection at this point is
important for the collaborative nature of the identity construction: ‘And
they never found a handgun on me’ (Example [1], line 25). In this formula-
tion, Dane clearly denies the existence of one type of illegal weapon, while
admitting to the other identiﬁed by the attorney as ‘a bunch of good for
nothing riﬂes.’ Note, in this connection, the purposefully ambiguous
phrasing of Jack’s promise that follows: ‘Then, we are going to say that
you showed good on these accusations and they need to ease o¤ your
back a little.’ (Example [1], lines 41–43). The guns are no longer in dis-
course; instead, the attorney refers to the overreaching pragmatic act, ‘ac-
cusations’. The phrasing is not just ambiguous but idiomatic (‘ease o¤ your
back a little’). In their analysis of topic transitions in ordinary talk, Drew
and Holt (1998) showed that the use of ﬁgures of speech functions as sum-
maries and therefore transition points. Indeed, at the end of the above ex-
cerpt, after Jack’s summary, the topic shifts to other matters (drugs and
witnesses). The promised act ﬁnds its written match in the attorney’s notes:
(3)
1! wants to argue ‘illegal weapons’
2 also, the amounts
3 write letter to PA
228 Alexander V. Kozin
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/28/16 10:05 AM
Thus, in a highly economical, which is also to say, deﬁnitive, and at the
same time ambiguous manner, the attorney transforms the content of the
client’s complaint by giving it a succinct formulation: ‘illegal weapons’
(line 1). It is worth noting that the attorney’s written formulation is iden-
tical to his initial oral formulation. Sche¤er (2006: 337) gives a detailed
examination of the attorney’s notebook to show that case making is es-
sentially a process of selective binding of ‘fresh talk’ to ‘gathered facts’.
Below ‘illegal weapons’, he puts down ‘the amounts’ referring to the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines that specify the quantity of the discovered
drugs in terms of the brackets or the number of years of imprisonment.
This relationship should give us the idea as to the relational identity, or
the identity of one object being deﬁned through the identity of another.
The pragmatic force ﬁlls the semantic content with a purpose: the con-
struction of the upcoming argument, as in the attorney’s promise to Dane
(‘we will say’). By his promise, Jack intends to create an arguable that
would reveal the identity of the ‘illegal weapons’ via its relation to an-
other item, ‘drugs’. It is then not the discursive object but the relation of
one item to another that comes to serve as the ‘arguable’ in the attorney’s
correspondence. According to Coulter (1990), an arguable is a sequen-
tially topicalized item of argumentation. For constructing his particular
arguable, the attorney simultaneously employs several identities for the
same object: the identity ‘illegal weapons’ as a shell, and the repeat on
the downgrade originally given by the defendant, ‘good for nothing riﬂes’,
as the implicature (Levinson 2000). The mode in which the attorney is go-
ing to carry out this transposition is writing, which meant another round
of textualization. I preview its analysis with a short summary of the ear-
lier ﬁndings.
4. ‘Firearm’ and its doubles
Thus far, we have seen how, in a stepwise fashion, the defense attorney
and his client topicalize an item extracted from the legal record and refor-
mulate it several times, while the attorney is compressing it into a hand-
written text, his notes. We have also seen that the object of discourse ac-
quired several interrelated identities that entered into a competition with
each other for impact in fulﬁlling a certain pragmatic task: present a most
proper ﬁgure. By ‘proper’, I mean ﬁtting to the purpose of the interaction
(provide a response to the Presentence Report). From this perspective,
discursive identity is pragmatic; it is a ﬁgure that, once placed within the
legal discourse, functions as an ‘arguable’. Therefore, the movement from
an object identity to another object identity, from one item to another,
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designates the process of ﬁguration, which is an interactional and com-
municative accomplishment of a particular pragmatic task. It is in this
process then that I see an inherent dynamism of the discursive object in
legal discourse. Importantly, no distance is covered by ‘reidentiﬁcations’;
only new ﬁgures and, therefore, new arguables are being made at the ‘ﬁg-
urative pivot’ (Holt and Drew 2005: 35). The next excerpt shows the re-
sources employed as to turning the previous arguable ‘a bunch of good
for nothing riles’ into the arguable ‘The Defendant herein has always
owned ﬁrearms.’ It is not surprising then that we ﬁnd this arguable in
the attorney’s Objection to Presentence Report, Paragraph 22:
(4)
1 Defendant objects to the 2 level increase for
2! possession of a ﬁrearm. Speciﬁcally,
3! FSG§2D1.1(b)(1) provides that ‘If a
4 dangerous weapon (including a ﬁrearm) was possessed,
5 increase by two levels.’ However, commentary
6 note Number 3 provides that ‘The enhancement
7! for weapon possession reﬂects the increased danger
8! of violence when drug tra‰ckers possess weapons.
9 The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was
10 present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
11 weapon was connected with the o¤ense.’ The Defendant
12 herein has always owned ﬁrearms. He possessed
13 ﬁrearms before he was involved in drug tra‰cking.
14! He had not changed his manner of ﬁrearm possession
15 simply because he was dealing drugs. As such,
16 it is improbable that the weapon was connected
17 with the o¤ense.
In this excerpt, the attorney joins the argument instigated by the proba-
tion o‰cer, who, in his Presentence Report, refers to rule FSG§2D1.1
(b) (1) that deﬁnes the preferred umbrella form for the discussed item,
and, through this encompassing formal category, links it to the arguable,
that is, a set of legal (formal) reasons, e.g., ‘If a dangerous weapon (in-
cluding a ﬁrearm) was possessed, increase by two levels’ (lines 3–5). A
strong orientation to rules turns them into the preferred arguables for le-
gal discourse (Halldorsdottir 2006). In this particular case, one might ex-
pect the argument to develop on the original grounds of the downgrade,
meaning that the emphasis is going to fall on the relevancy of a kind of
gun and that the defendant’s formulation ‘BB guns’ will be expressed in
the corresponding deﬁnition of a ‘not [so] dangerous weapon’. Instead,
the attorney constructs an exemption from the rule by o¤ering a set of
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progressively ordered references to the defendant’s habitual behavior
associated with ‘ﬁrearms’ (line 2) in general. The term ‘ﬁrearm’ comes
linked to the term ‘weapons’ (lines 7 and 8), the item that the attorney
marked for textualization. The modiﬁer ‘illegal’ of the original phrase is
omitted for the reasons of ambiguity: the attorney is creating a space for
the route that would let him introduce the behavioral pattern of the de-
fendant. Attributing and denying responsibility is inevitable in the context
of accusing someone of a wrongdoing (Pomerantz 1978). Instead, he opts
for the neutral ‘ﬁrearm’ again (line 14). Note in this connection the em-
phatic use of adverbs ‘always’ and ‘simply’ in the last two sentences of
the excerpt (underlined, lines 12 and 15, respectively). These uses indicate
that the attorney might be resorting to ‘an extreme case formulation’ that
was deployed by one ‘to defend against or counter challenges to the legit-
imacy of complaints, accusations, justiﬁcations, and defenses’ (Pomerantz
1986: 219). Together, they meet on the same semantic platform of ‘consis-
tency’. The shift means new implications for the identity of the object
under discussion. When positioned within the ‘character’ argument, the
formal use of the term ‘ﬁrearms’—coupled with the term ‘illegal weap-
on’—points to the old and vulgar identity of a gun, which, although no
longer harmless in itself, becomes harmless in the hands of the ‘consistent’
defendant, and therefore cannot be considered as a dangerous weapon.
In this way, the object originally deﬁned as ‘illegal weapons’ again dis-
closes its duality; it is both deﬁnitive and ambiguous. Its deﬁnitiveness is
maintained by two referential linkages: (i) to the defendant as the self-
admitted criminal and the possessor of the ‘guns’, and (ii) to the legal
rule that speciﬁes the role of the guns as ‘illegal weapons’. Although the
item ‘weapon’ is presented in the generic sense, as an arguable it provides
the generic item with speciﬁcity by performing a reduction to instrumen-
tality, i.e., the weapon’s ‘use’. The connection of the ‘use of weapons’ to
the speciﬁcity of the defendant’s behavior merges the deﬁnitive and the
ambiguous toward presenting the previous ﬁgure as yet another ﬁgure.
This other ﬁgure has a di¤erent lexical form, and a di¤erent act is as-
signed to it. Although it is textualized in the same medium, writing, it is
placed on a di¤erent trajectory of opposition. At the end of this trajec-
tory, the multi-term ‘ﬁrearm-illegal weapon’ undergoes a pivotal transﬁg-
uration through the argument, changing the meaning of ‘illegal weapons’
ﬁrst to ‘useless guns’ and then to ‘possessed weapons’. The co-presence of
these terms within the same argument not only endows the transﬁgured
object with deﬁnitive ambiguity; they make the argument itself appear as
two-sided again. Namely, it is introduced as the legal argument about the
danger of possessing weapons for the criminal, and in the course of its
construction, the argument links itself to the discussion of the defendant’s
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character in terms of his probable actions. The mechanism of connecting
is reminiscent of the one done in civil litigation, where a dispute under-
goes transformation by splitting the initial claim into several claims by
the contrary party (Felstiner et al. 1980/1981). In the Savery case, the du-
ality is upheld in the response from the probation o‰cer, who presents
the object under discussion as a cluster of lexical variants, using the infor-
mal ‘guns’ and formal ‘ﬁrearms’ intermittently. His use of the two identi-
ties in the Addendum to the Presentence Report, Paragraph 22, di¤ers
drastically from that of the Attorney’s Objection:
(5)
1 As noted in Paragraph 9 of the Presentence Report,
2! the defendant traded guns for methamphetamine.
3 Several of the individuals involved in drug transactions
4! with the defendant reported they traded guns for
5 drugs with him. In addition, others witnessed him
6! possess a ﬁrearm, either on his person or in his
7 vehicle, while tra‰cking drugs or using drugs.
8 The defendant told Alice Iron Ax the reason he carried
9! a ﬁrearm was to protect himself and in case
10 law enforcement came around. She also reported on one of
11 the trips to Sioux City for methamphetamine, he
12! transported 12 guns in the back seat of his vehicle.
13 There are several cases that support an enhancement
14! when there is a ﬁrearm present in connection
15 with a drug transaction. The following cases support
16 a two-level enhancement [further, ten cases are cited].
17 Therefore, the two-level enhancement should remain.
From this passage it appears that the probation o‰cer extends both items
‘guns’ (lines 2 and 4) and ‘ﬁrearms’ (line 6) as the two branches of the
same semantic tree. The use of the two terms appears to be interchange-
able: the probation o‰cer refers to both terms several times in the same
context of witnesses and testimonies. However, the appearance of inter-
changeability is deceptive, for the two close synonyms reference two dif-
ferent ﬁelds of presence. While the term ‘guns’ comes from the testimo-
nies of the ‘individuals involved in drug transactions with the defendant’,
the use of ‘ﬁrearm’ (lines 9, 14) references the defense attorney’s objec-
tion; it thus pursues a legal argument. By connecting the term ‘guns’
(lines 2, 4, 12) with ‘ﬁrearm’ (lines 6, 9, 14), the attorney connects the
two ﬁelds, which allows him to present the original object of discourse as
a two-sided identity, replicating the object’s structure from the Presen-
tence Report. In turn, the co-presence of the two identities ensures witness
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testimonies, which come from the same ﬁeld of presence as the defend-
ant’s testimony, with legal rather than common identities. In those texts,
the probation o‰cer uses the term ‘guns’, which, once positioned side by
side with the term ‘ﬁrearms’, not only allows for the dual identity of the
object to continue but, and more importantly, steers toward its legaliza-
tion across the evoked identities. In the wake of this change, the every-
day, which generates the defense attorney’s argument, also becomes legal-
ized. In a sense, the probation o‰cer reﬁgures the term ‘weapon’ in the
opposite direction to the direction suggested in the defense attorney’s
objection.
At this juncture, it might be worth exploring the content of the refer-
enced testimonies, for they connect the character of the defendant to the
use of weapons and, ﬁnally, to the weapons themselves:
(6) a. Salem (9/19/2001) reported that ‘Savery is a violent person and
always possesses a ﬁrearm. Savery has used ﬁrearms to intimi-
date people who are late with payments to Savery. He gets his
arms in exchange for meth.’
b. Garrison (9/19/2001) has observed ‘Dane Savery with two
handguns and two riﬂes. Garrison has observed Savery dis-
charging a Glock .45 and 9mm pistol in front of his wife.’
c. Belle Savery (12/12/2001) advised that ‘Dane always carries a
gun on his person. She estimated that he has approximately 30
guns. Dane always carries a gun in the small of his back. He
also told her that he would use it ‘‘without hesitation.’’ ’
d. Alice Iron Ax (17/03/2002): ‘Savery would say he would want
to see her dance and would shoot his Glock .40 caliber near her
feet. She observed numerous guns and a pistol and a silver mag-
num. She observed him trade guns in various locations.’
The power of these testimonies lies in their collective and thus cumulative
impact (there are 23 accepted testimonies in the Savery ﬁle). They formu-
late and reformulate the same object within a very limited space of signi-
ﬁcation. It is in this sense that their identity is collective; they also provide
for the identiﬁcation of the same object (‘illegal weapons’) through refer-
encing a variety of actual brands of guns. Both handguns and riﬂes are
mentioned. Their collective identity as an illegal weapon comes from two
sources: all the references point to the relationship between the witnesses
and the defendant. The second source is the identity of Savery himself at
the time evoked in witness testimonies: from the testimonies, he clearly
comes out as a drug dealer. Finally, as a drug dealer who handles weap-
ons, according to the witnesses, Savery did not use them to ‘shoot prairie
dogs’ but carry out intimidating actions. They were ‘acting guns’, and
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though their actions exceeded ‘common use’, they could only be illegal in
the context of the defendant’s illegal activities, which constituted the
densest part of the case. By binding the defendant’s speciﬁc objection
under the general category ‘illegal weapons’, the defense attorney opened
it for referential dispersal. Directing the dispersal from the documented
witness testimonies, in his turn, the probation o‰cer imposed the identity
of ‘illegal weapons’ onto speciﬁc weapons, extending the defendant’s orig-
inal ‘BB. Guns’ or ‘not so dangerous weapons’ into the category ‘danger-
ous weapons’.
5. Identity restitution
In the course of the above transformations, the probation o‰cer and the
defense attorney collaborate in integrating the defendant’s objection into
the previously established set and then in deﬁning the set in terms of the
argument, now on the level of evidence. To put it di¤erently, by his objec-
tion, the probation o‰cer grounds the arguable identity of ‘not so dan-
gerous guns’ in the proper (for the legal realm) ‘factual paradigm’. At the
same time as they assume a paradigmatic role in the discourse, the ‘BB
guns’ gain su‰cient ambiguity to be able to return to the beginning, i.e.,
their ﬁrst mention following the item ‘illegal weapons’. The act of objec-
tion that evoked ‘illegal weapons’ during the conference got countered by
the act of rejection. By meeting each other, the two acts form an adja-
cency pair that returns the item under discussion to the place of its origin.
The return means the sustained identity for the object ‘illegal weapon’,
whose transformations along the path of completing the adjacency pair
of ‘report-objection’ failed to secure either one of them into a di¤erent
identity. The defense attorney’s correspondence to the defendant in the
wake of the probation o‰cer’s rejection summarizes this process.
(7) Dear Dane:
Find enclosed herewith the response to my Objections.
As I told you, we are going to have a di‰cult time getting any of
these objections sustained by the Court. The response by the proba-
tion o‰ce is active. Get back to me.
Sincerely,
Jack Dorman
The letter ﬁnalizes the construction of the identity ‘illegal weapons’ by
making it dissipate behind the purpose for its ‘deployment’, i.e., the de-
fense attorney’s ‘Objections’. The letter is a result of the encounter be-
tween several arguables, or rhetorical identities, generated by the two
234 Alexander V. Kozin
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/28/16 10:05 AM
sides in their responding to each other; hence, the reminder to the client
that it is the probation o‰cer’s response that ‘remains active’. As soon
as the ‘Objections’ close, the identity of the ﬁxed object withers away, as
it were, ceasing its dynamism until its next resurfacing in a similarly rele-
vant legal fact. The conditions for that resurfacing are provided by the
letter’s ending where the attorney invites the defendant to respond. A full
hermeneutic circle emerges here, a completed trajectory, which begins
with the attorney soliciting a response from the client, and ends after a
certain course of actions, with the possibility of yet another problematiza-
tion, and therefore a new action for the sake of law.
6. Concluding remarks
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis.
First, in response to the original question, it appears that to ﬁx an object
in text does not mean halting its dynamism; it only means providing it
with a platform for various appearances. In the legal discourse of the an-
alyzed data, these appearances occur within a speciﬁc space of signiﬁca-
tion, i.e., a case, which serves as the referential grid that gathers discursive
actions into a particular ‘whole’. In this respect, the change of its identity
means that, rather than being displaced, upon its engagement in either
medium—text or talk—a discursive object becomes transformed toward
satisfying a speciﬁc context-imposed purpose. If we accept that the legal
context presupposes that this purpose involves an argument, then discur-
sive transformations change the object as long as they create a new ﬁgure,
a new arguable. In the legal discourse, arguments tend to proceed along a
particular path, which is punctuated by case-relevant ﬁgures that, once
documented, create an impression of ‘ﬁxed facts’. Indeed, these facts are
but pivots that mark the starting point of argumentation. Their engage-
ment leads to the process of ﬁguration, which, in turn, involves revolu-
tions around the initial point of invocation. As a result of these transfor-
mations, the object of discourse comes to possess multiple identities;
importantly, none of these identities enjoys the status of the original or
true identity; none of them counts as facts on their own.
The analyzed excerpt from a real criminal case demonstrated how an
object of discourse, i.e., the term ‘illegal weapons’, appeared as the origi-
nal identity evoked as an account by the defense attorney and used for
the construction of a legal objection to the Presentence Report, where
this identity was previously ‘ﬁxed’. The purpose of the objection was the
dismissal of the problematic object (‘illegal weapons’), its removal from
the record, its virtual disappearance. Instead, the item ‘illegal weapons’
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remained, owing to the argument carried out by the probation o‰cer,
who succeeded in retaining the original legal identity while ﬁghting down
the imposition of a di¤erent one. As a result, at the end of its ‘journey’
within the case-deﬁned space of signiﬁcation, the object ‘illegal weapons’
returned to the place of its formation in the ﬁgure of ‘dangerous weap-
ons’, only to be ‘ﬁxed’ there again until the next surfacing. In the course
of the argument, the object underwent several transformations, from
‘weapons’ to ‘guns’, from ‘guns’ to ‘ﬁrearms’, and then back to weapons,
changing its facets, without, however, changing its pivotal connection,
i.e., the ﬁrst identity brought into e¤ect by an argument. From this per-
spective, the fact that the ﬁgurative identity belongs to the written ﬁeld is
less signiﬁcant than its belonging to a space of signiﬁcation in general and
a certain argumentation ﬁeld in particular, for it is as an arguable that the
term ‘illegal weapons’ sustained itself in its course.
Notes
1. Ambiguity itself can become a means of deﬁniteness when it is applied strategically. For
example, ‘In criminal cases, both the government and the defense tend to hear what they
want to hear [ . . . ] they create and interpret ambiguous utterances in the way that best
serves their purposes’ (Shuy 2001: 446).
2. The ﬁeldwork was occasioned by an international project ‘Comparative Microsociology
of the Criminal Defensework’ which has been located in Berlin, Germany, under the
auspices of Freie Universita¨t Berlin and with the generous support from the DFG
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). The project’s original objective has been the exam-
ination of court hearings as ritualized events with an emphasis on how their ritualization
and/or conﬁguration are being achieved via various practices and activities performed
and assembled by the defense ensemble. Therefore, at the core of the project lie those
methods, artifacts, and devices that punctuate the process of legal performance at all
stages of its enactment in di¤erent legal settings.
3. All the names that appear in the data excerpts were altered to protect the participants’
anonymity.
4. Slang term for ‘informant’.
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